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Chapter Summary 
This essay will consider first how scientific developments have enhanced 
the human capacity for evil. I will concentrate on instances where 
advances in science directly led to enhanced possibilities for weaponry. 
My key examples will be chemical warfare in World War I and atomic 
bombs in World War II. The second part of the essay will reflect on 
instances where scientific advances aid human understanding of harms. 
Here I will mention the discovery of anthropogenic climate change, and 
then discuss in more detail the way Darwinian thinking heightens our 
understanding of the theological challenges of both moral and natural 
evil. My conclusion is that the impact of the sciences is very diverse and 
ambiguous, highly dependent on context, but that its disclosures about the 
  
character of the natural world are of great value both practically and in 
my own discipline of philosophical theology.  
______________________________ 
 
Introduction 
In this essay I shall seek to subvert two obvious caricatures. The first is 
that the role of modern science has been almost uniformly positive, 
enormously enhancing our knowledge and understanding as well as 
making possible all sorts of beneficial technologies, and that in the few 
exceptions to this rule, the scientific community has itself been innocent. 
The second is that the main effect of science on the modern world has 
been to potentiate human capacity to inflict harm, both on other humans 
and on the biosphere. To that end I propose to consider two cases in 
which new science has been directly applied to give rise to technologies 
for inflicting types and extents of harms previously impossible. These 
will be the use of chemical warfare and of nuclear weapons. I then 
consider two cases in which science has revealed aspects of the world 
that were not previously suspected, and which clarify how and why 
harms occur – the discovery of climate change in the 20th Century and of 
evolution by natural selection in the 19th. 
My own background is in the natural sciences, especially chemistry and 
biochemistry, and more recently in theology, with a particular focus on 
  
the problem of evil. This very much informs the examples I have chosen 
to illustrate my case, but I nevertheless consider them both representative 
and informative. 
As I write this chapter, the Assad regime in Syria is rumoured to be 
considering the use of chemical weapons on its own population, and the 
Doha talks on climate change are approaching a point of crisis as to 
whether the most developed, and ‘polluting’ countries need to 
compensate the poor countries on whom much of the impact of climate 
change is predicted to fall. The role of the United States is interesting in 
both these instances. The apprehension of the Obama administration at 
the prospect of a compensatory framework in respect of climate change 
reflects not just the desire to avoid legally-binding commitments (the 
‘compensation’ was eventually agreed in the form of ‘aid’), but also the 
deep suspicion that persists in the Republican Congress as to whether the 
scientific consensus is correct on this issue. The warnings the US 
Government has issued to Syria indicate its conviction that the use of the 
science of chemical warfare would constitute a barbarous and 
unacceptable escalation of the civil war in that country. At once we can 
see how diversely science can be appropriated – its products can arouse 
horror, and the threat of their use can lead to immediate counter-
measures. Its disclosures can summon world conferences, where 
nevertheless major players reject or partially reject its conclusions.   
  
 
Evil 
I take ‘evil’ for the purposes of this essay to include not only harms, and 
the resultant suffering, caused to sentient creatures by the free choices of 
rational agents (so-called ‘moral evil’) but also harms, and the resultant 
suffering, caused to sentient creatures by other factors such as predation, 
parasitism, and evolutionary competition, as well as earthquakes, 
volcanoes, droughts etc. (so-called ‘natural evil’). 
I want to note a scale of values that seems to be implicit in our attitude to 
the infliction of moral evil. Typically, we seem to be more concerned at 
the infliction of harms and suffering where there is a power differential 
between inflictor and victim. We are especially outraged (and rightly so) 
by child abuse and rape. We take a gang attack on an individual to be 
more serious than an individual assault. We are more disturbed by the 
attack of a soldier on a non-combatant than by the clash of two soldiers. 
We also tend to regard calculated, premeditated actions to be more 
serious than spontaneous ones. Jesus, defending his torturers to his 
Father, did so on the grounds that they knew not what they did – they 
were incapable of making the sort of calculation that would make them 
fully culpable. The suffering-causing actions of governments, which are 
both powerful and, typically, premeditating agents, against individuals 
and groups, particularly disturb us. One of the great images of the 20th 
  
Century is the Chinese protester who stands before the tank in Tiananmen 
Square – individual against regime, vulnerability against armoured might. 
There is more concern over the US drone attacks in Pakistan than over 
the use of special forces to achieve the same ends, presumably because 
vulnerability attaches to the latter, and alters our sense of power 
differential. But certain uses of science and technology have occasioned 
especial revulsion and led to strenuous efforts at prohibition, and the two 
cases I have chosen – chemical warfare and nuclear weapons – fall into 
that category. Something, then, about certain kinds of science, has a very 
particular relation to our attitudes to evil. 
I believe we should be wary of the scale of values I have just outlined. Its 
great problem is that it seems to license as acceptable certain forms of 
harm. The battle between the Sharks and the Jets in ‘West Side Story’ 
(and that in Verona that was its source) is a roughly equal contest, not 
involving governments, or high-tech weaponry used from a distance. But 
that great story of love illustrates profoundly the depth of suffering that 
socially-licensed feuds can engender. Likewise, just war theory allows 
proportionate force, used as a last resort by a legitimate authority, but no 
Christian should be easy with its use in the name of the Prince of Peace. 
The present tragic civil war in Syria illustrates perfectly the dubiousness 
of scales of evil. The Assad regime has pursued its ends with increasing 
brutality against its opponents, including the use against civilians of 
  
armour, artillery and air-strikes. Yet there has been a sense that with the 
recent threat of the use of chemical weapons a line has been crossed, and 
the likelihood of NATO intervention has suddenly become much greater. 
It is not at all clear why. Terrible harms, reflecting high levels of 
premeditation and differentials of power, can be and have been 
perpetrated without recourse to the chemical agents that are now causing 
such concern. 
There is no scope here to enter the very intricate debate about the relation 
between science and technology, beyond acknowledging that this 
relationship is itself complex, and that science sometimes leads 
technological development, but may also follow it. For introductions to 
the interplay between science, technology and ethics see Stewart, 2011; 
Herzfeld, 2009; Brock, 2010. In the examples I have chosen to illustrate, 
new science was translated more or less immediately into new ways of 
causing harms, the technology emerging directly from scientific 
advances. That is not to say that this translation is necessarily a 
straightforward one. In the case of chemical warfare, the early use of 
lachrymators proved ineffective, and the most effective agents proved to 
be very different from the bulk use of chlorine with which chemical 
warfare began in earnest. In the case of nuclear fission, the design of a 
bomb proved to involve a series of technical challenges that occupied a 
scientific team of extraordinary talent for over three years. 
  
 
Science as inflictor of harms 
My first example – eerily echoed by the crisis in Syria – is the 
development during World War I of chemical agents as ways of clearing 
battlefields and breaking the deadlock of trench warfare. The 
development of such agents is one reason what this has been known as 
‘the chemists’ war’. The background to this development is the enormous 
expansion of the chemical industries of the great powers, especially 
Germany, from the mid-19th Century onwards. The benefits to 
civilization, in terms of fuels, fertilisers, dyes, and medications (to name 
just a few areas) were enormous. That same industry was also well geared 
to the production of toxic substances for the battlefield. Fascinatingly, 
there were efforts to prohibit such weapons even before they were 
introduced. The Hague Peace Conferences of 1899 and 1907 were 
concerned about the weapons made possible by new technologies. Hague 
I banned ‘all projectiles the sole object of which is the diffusion of 
asphyxiating or deleterious gases’ (quoted in Haber 1986:16). Hague II 
was concerned to ban ‘projectiles, weapons and materials which might 
cause unnecessary suffering’ (Haber 1986:17). As I indicated above, this 
licenses in a very dubious way the concept of necessary suffering. But 
‘poison or poisoned weapons’ were specifically banned. 
Nevertheless, the French possessed as early as August 1914 cartridges 
  
containing lachrymators (Haber 1986:23-24), though when used in March 
1915 these were less effective than had been envisaged, as were early 
German attempts using lachrymators. Bulk releases of chlorine in April-
May 1915 proved tactically limited (Haber 1986:36), as did the use of the 
much more toxic phosgene. But a new dimension was added to chemical 
warfare in 1917 by the use of highly toxic vesicants such as bis(2-
chloroethyl)sulphide (mustard gas), the ‘king of battle gases’ (Hessel, 
Martin and Hessel 1940:89). Though this was not a new chemical, any 
more than chlorine, a new and simpler synthesis made it a potent agent of 
war.1 From there on research developed apace. The arsenical vesicant 
‘Lewisite’ was first prepared in 1918 and began to be manufactured after 
the war had ended.2 The extremely potent nerve agents tabun (the ethyl 
 
1 It may also be that a report of an accident to a British chemist working 
with mustard gas alerted the German Chemical Society to its possibilities 
(Duchovic and Vilensky, 2007). 
2 The counter-agent ‘British anti-Lewisite’ was prepared by Sir Rudolph 
Peters’ group at Oxford during World War II. I had the privilege, while in 
the biochemistry department at Cambridge in the 1970s, of hearing 
lectures by Peters on chemical agents of warfare. Then eighty-five, he 
was wonderfully lucid and entertaining, and still active in the laboratory 
(a possibility sadly often denied now to senior scientists in retirement). 
  
ester of dimethylphosphoroamidocyanidic acid) and sarin (the isopropyl ester of 
methylfluophosphonic acid) were first produced as by-products of 
pesticide research in Germany (for an account of the development of 
these choline esterase inhibitors see Tucker 2006:24-54). Never used by 
the Nazis, sarin was a component on the chemical attack on the Kurdish 
city of Halabja by Saddam Hussein’s Iraq in 1988. Such 
organophosphorus agents can kill in tiny doses and can contaminate 
ground for long periods. They are the only true ‘weapons of mass 
destruction’ among known chemical weapons (Spiers 1994:3-4). 
What comes across in the literature is the appetite, in time of war, to press 
science into immediate service (sometimes at the expense of systematic 
exploration of what would and wouldn’t work). In World War I this 
attempt to exploit the possibilities of science reached unprecedented 
levels. But I question whether the use of the science fundamentally 
altered the character of the harms that were being attempted against 
others. Trenches and battlefields were to be cleared by whatever means 
necessary. Nor, despite the horrible character of the injuries caused by 
chemicals (so vividly captured in Wilfred Owen’s poem ‘Dulce et 
Decorum Est’) is it clear that this use of technology differed so 
 
He died in 1982. 
 
  
profoundly in character from other strategies of destruction as to merit its 
extraordinary reputation for ignominy. This question has been well 
pressed by Richard Price in his The Chemical Weapons Taboo (1997). He 
notes that The Times newspaper of April 29 1915, responding to the first 
use of chlorine at Ypres argued that ‘the use of “a few shells which 
spread death in the air” was no more inhumane than the employment of 
“hundreds of guns and howitzers… in order to destroy and break to atoms 
everything living” (Price 1997:51). Fritz Haber, the Nobel Prizewinning 
chemist who directed the early German use of chemical warfare, 
considered that ‘chemical warfare was more humane than blast or flame 
and would serve to shorten wars and save lives.’ (Tucker 2006:23)  
Indeed, the will to enforce prohibition of chemical warfare lagged a long 
way behind work on its development. In his survey of the subject L.F. 
Haber, Fritz Haber’s son, describes the 1925 Geneva Protocol, which 
prohibited the use of chemical weapons, as possibly having ‘moral 
influence’ but being ‘without teeth’ (Haber 1986:296). The great powers 
continued to hold and develop chemical weapons. Richard McCarthy 
notes that ‘[b]y the middle of 1942, the United States had 1,250 tons of 
mustard gas on hand’, (McCarthy 1970:41) though by the end of that year 
it had been decided that ‘only the President could order a retaliatory gas 
attack’ (42). He goes on to record a tragic incident in which over six 
hundred gas casualties resulted from German bombing of a U.S. ship in 
  
harbor at Bari, Italy, which carried one hundred tons of mustard gas 
bombs. The secrecy surrounding chemical weapons was such that the 
casualties did not receive proper treatment. (42-3).               
I am inclined to agree with Price’s analysis that the prohibition of 
chemical weapons in the Hague Conventions resulted from a desire to 
establish norms for the ‘civilised’ use of war as an instrument of policy, 
combined with a concern about the use of poisons. The latter concern is, 
as Price shows, centuries old (and again reflects a concern about the 
destabilizing of hierarchies, and the endangering of the strong). As we 
have seen, prohibitions on chemical agents were only effective in a very 
limited way in World War I.  
There remains the question as to why, if chemical weapons were not 
considered the unthinkable barbarity that they are now painted to be, they 
were not used in World War II. Again, the reasons were probably 
complex. Price shows that the Germans had (at least) two remarkable 
opportunities to use such weapons – against the retreating British 
Expeditionary Force at Dunkirk, and against the invading Allies on the 
Normandy beaches. In the first case, Hitler may have wanted not to 
jeopardise the chances of a good peace with the British; in the second, he 
may have been properly apprehensive of the possible Allied response. 
Indeed, Price quotes a memo of Churchill’s, dated July 6, 1944, in which 
he writes: ‘I want a cold-blooded calculation made as to how it would pay 
  
us to use poison gas, by which I mean principally mustard… We could 
drench the cities of the Ruhr and many other cities in Germany in such a 
way that most of the population would be requiring constant medical 
attention’ (quoted in Price 1997:123). 
Not until 1993 was the Chemical Weapons Convention, banning not only 
use but production of chemical weapons, opened for signature by the 
UN.3 It seems to me that the singling out of these weapons for 
proscription in the 1990s has much in common with the effort to ban 
them in the 1890s. They do not form a convenient part of the power-
games by which the ‘civilised’ nations interact. There is a risk that they 
may be used to subvert such power-games. In particular, chemical 
arsenals may be used as deterrence, for instance, by non-nuclear nations 
to try and substitute for the deterrent effect of a nuclear arsenal (hence the 
reluctance of a group of Arab states to sign the Chemical Weapons 
Convention – see Price 1997:160). In observing the complexity of this 
issue I am not for a moment supposing that a ban on chemical weapons is 
not desirable, and indeed – if enforced – will not come as a great relief to 
the people of Syria. I merely wish to emphasise that the singling out of 
 
3 Interestingly, the convention banning the ‘hostile use of environmental 
modification techniques’ (such as the herbicidal warfare practiced by the US in 
Vietnam) preceded the chemical weapons convention by 16 years. See Zierler 
2011 on herbicidal warfare. It may well be that the CWC was precipitated by 
Halabja, just as the convention on herbicides was a reaction to Vietnam.  
  
such weapons is a construct of international politics, rather than an 
absolutely clear ethical distinction based on the character of the 
weaponry.  
There is an interesting link between my first case-study and my second. 
Otto Hahn, lead discoverer of nuclear fission, served as a scientific 
observer in Haber’s chemical warfare team in World War I. He is 
reported to have queried the use of chlorine on the Western Front, and 
been reassured that no illegality was involved (Price 1997:48). The use of 
nuclear fission is the most famous instance of a scientific advance being 
turned directly into weaponry of staggering violence. The story of how a 
group of physicists sent a letter to Roosevelt in 1939, signed by Einstein, 
to make clear to the President the significance of fission research has 
been well rehearsed (see for example Jungk, 1958:83-86, 106-7). The 
explosive power available in even the first such device exceeded many-
thousand-fold that available by non-nuclear means. Fission weapons, and 
their yet-more-destructive successor the hydrogen bomb, transformed 
humans into the one species that could devastate the whole biosphere 
within a very short time. So this is an instance of a step-change in 
humans’ capacity for evil.  
It was in December 1938 that Hahn, working with Fritz Strassmann, first 
unequivocally recognized that barium, which came to be understood as 
necessarily the product of a process of fission, was being produced when 
  
uranium was bombarded with slow neutrons. He was greatly helped to 
understand the significance of his results by his recently-exiled Jewish 
colleague Lise Meitner and her nephew Otto Frisch.4 Hahn himself 
completely rejects the suggestion of Robert Jungk that he considered 
concealing his results (Hahn 1970:164). And indeed, his rejection is 
highly plausible, given that like so many scientific discoveries, this one 
emerged through stumbling steps and the collaboration of a number of 
intellects in different teams (and not without its squabbles). The 
magnificent radiochemistry of Hahn and Strassmann required the insights 
of Meitner and Frisch to clarify the fission process, and the resulting 
energy release. Niels Bohr was also much involved, and – importantly - 
took the news to Princeton in very early 1939. The discovery that 
neutrons were released in the process, making a chain reaction a 
possibility, was made at Columbia University, not in Berlin. For a 
scholarly summary of the road from Hahn’s laboratory to Hiroshima see 
Kragh 1999: 257-75. Hahn’s sense that, in effect, he was simply 
interrogating nature, albeit a very involved and surprising aspect of that 
nature, is typical of the instincts of the experimentalist. When challenged 
on the use of his discovery Hahn is said to have replied ‘I have never 
worked on atomic weapons and I have nothing to do with it.’ (Schrader 
 
4 I try to explore something of the ‘chemistry’ of that scientific relationship in my poem 
‘Taboo’ (2006a: 60-2). 
  
1970:232)  
Jungk notes the paradox that: ‘the German nuclear physicists, living 
under a sabre-rattling dictatorship, obeyed the voice of conscience and 
attempted to prevent the construction of atom bombs, while their 
professional colleagues in the democracies, who had no coercion to fear, 
concentrated their whole energies on the production of the new weapon’ 
(Jungk 1958:102). The difference was, he goes on to say, quoting an 
unnamed source, that (rightly or wrongly) they ‘had confidence in the 
decency and sense of justice of their governments’. The source went on, 
‘I doubt, incidentally, whether exactly the same situation prevails in those 
countries today.’ I explore the question of trust between scientists and 
states further below.5  
 
The power available from nuclear fission represents a different sort of 
case from chemical warfare, in that it was first employed in weaponry, 
 
5 A further complication of this relationship in respect of physics is that 
nuclear physics (as opposed to the intricate radiochemistry of Hahn and 
Strassmann) requires very big machines and enormous investment – as 
Hughes notes, in the 1930s it was already on the way to becoming ‘big 
science’ (Hughes 2003, 45-63) which only governments could 
commission. 
  
and only then were the civilian uses in energy generation explored. The 
desirability of such uses remains of course a fiercely contested issue. 
In terms of implementation of scientific advances with the potential for 
evil, three cases can be interestingly compared: 
The first is the use of mustard gas, outlined above. The importance of a 
toxic agent that persisted in the field, and of the efficacy of the new 
synthesis, became evident in time of war, a war moreover which 
scientific establishments generally trusted their governments to prosecute 
with integrity. The only German hesitation about the use of mustard gas 
seems to have been that it might not be toxic enough (Haber 1986:117). It 
was finally pressed into service by a system that included within it very 
distinguished scientists. 
Our second case is that of nuclear fission, and begins with Otto Hahn 
(who had been one of those same scientist-observers in our first case). He 
is involved in an intricate international network of chemists and 
physicists, and discovers something astonishing about the world of 
nature. He publishes it unhesitatingly and does not regret doing so despite 
the potential, which emerges very quickly, for the making of a weapon. 
He declares his science neutral. Faced with the character of the Third 
Reich and the Japanese Empire, the international community of scientists 
persuades Roosevelt that the weapon must be made. 
These two cases may be compared with the decision of the molecular 
  
biology community in 1974 to hold a moratorium (voluntary, but 
apparently everywhere observed) on the transfer of sections of DNA from 
one context to another. This technique had huge potential to further 
biochemical research, and to revolutionise medicine (though interestingly 
its direct medical application has proved more elusive than expected). It 
also carried with it significant risks, and indeed the possibility of its being 
used militarily, for instance to increase the infectivity or drug resistance 
of pathogens. The moratorium, which lasted a year, was without parallel 
in science. For an account of the moratorium, and the decision to end it, 
see Wade 1975. 6 
To line up cases in this way immediately reveals profound differences, 
but it is instructive all the same. Historical context is clearly of the 
greatest importance. ‘Things ill done and done to others’ harm’7  are done 
with much less hesitation in war than in time of peace. It is noteworthy 
that it was not until after Pearl Harbour that the Manhattan Project was 
actually launched. 
The provisions on chemical warfare in the Hague Conventions of 1899 
and 1907 have some analogies with the hybrid-DNA moratorium, in their 
 
6 Wade notes that ‘The conference’s decisions [to end the moratorium but to replace it 
with tight regulation] were reached in the explicit awareness that science no longer 
enjoys the automatic favor of governments and society, and that if the scientists present 
failed to regulate themselves in an evidently disinterested manner, others would do so 
for them.’ (Wade 1975:931). So now the issue is society’s trust of science, rather than 
scientists’ trust of their governments. 
7 Eliot 1969:194. 
  
seeking to curtail a technology before it had been developed, but 
significantly Hague only sought to ban use, not development, and its 
proscriptions were swept aside by war. 
Also, the character of the science concerned is important. Chemistry sits 
in the centre of the natural sciences and is in a way their servant. It is rare 
that chemistry by itself reveals a deep truth about the nature of the 
cosmos, or of life. Hahn’s experiments might seem an exception, but his 
results needed to be put at the service of physics for their full 
appropriation. A great deal of chemistry ‘simply’ makes substances and 
analyses available and understandable and useful for a whole variety of 
purposes. That is part of its ethos. (An example would be the discovery of 
the structure of the nucleotides that make up DNA, painstaking work 
without which the much more far-reaching structural discovery of Crick 
and Watson would have been impossible.) Further, chemistry is an old 
science, and as I noted above the mechanisms for putting its discoveries 
to use were very well established (particularly in Germany) by the time of 
the First World War. 
There is perhaps more parallel, then, between the infant science of 
nuclear physics in the 1930s and that of molecular biology in the 1970s. 
These were young communities of scientists with little background in 
putting their discoveries to use. It is an intriguing thought-experiment to 
wonder whether, in a different political context, the physics community 
  
could have agreed, and imposed, a moratorium on the exploration of 
fission analogous to that on work with hybrid DNA. Efforts were made 
by Leo Szilard and others in this direction – not to suspend work, but to 
censor its communication to colleagues under totalitarian regimes (Jungk 
1958:74-79). I am inclined to think an agreed moratorium improbable in 
any political context, simply because the power available as a result of 
the scientific discovery was so great that governments would always have 
been bound to take matters into their own hands. (However, efforts to 
restrict the use of fission technology to certain countries persist, and they 
remain a vital part of the current politics of the Middle East.) 
Of course, many other examples could be given where science has been 
used to potentiate evil. There are also important cases in which well-
intentioned science has led to unforeseen detriments. When I was being 
taught inorganic chemistry at school, two of the cases most proudly 
produced of the success of using the Periodic Table to benefit human life 
were tetra-ethyl lead as an anti-knock agent in gasoline, and 
chlorofluorocarbons as non-flammable, chemically stable refrigerants. 
Thirty years later, leaded fuel was being phased out because of damage to 
the brains of infants, and the first generation of CFCs were being banned 
because of their effects on the ozone layer. Science gave rise to the Green 
Revolution in agriculture, but also to the ethically highly ambiguous 
effects of genetically-modified crops. The use of agents such as DDT still 
  
gives hope to malaria-plagued areas, but it has long-term and far-reaching 
ecological effects, vividly depicted by Rachel Carson in Silent Spring. 
These agents were also made into a weapon of ‘herbicidal warfare’, with 
terrible effects on human health in Vietnam (see Zierler 2011). 
War, too, has had a very ambivalent inheritance. It gave rise to the atomic 
bomb, but also, through the work of the cryptography unit at Bletchley 
Park, to the modern computer, which in turn has made possible all sorts 
of discoveries about the character of our universe, not to mention 
empowering all sorts of human lives subject to disability or isolation.8 
 
Science used to disclose harms  
I turn now to the first of my examples in which modern science acts an 
ally to human understanding in disclosing evil-causing factors in the 
make-up of the world. This is climate change, which has now joined 
major nuclear exchange as a second way in which humans could radically 
destabilize the biosphere and render it much less habitable. For an 
account of how much damage a six-degree rise in global mean surface 
temperature would do (let alone a ‘runaway’ greenhouse effect) see Mark 
 
8 A good example of the knowledge only made possible by computers is the 
development of chaos theory through the computational modeling of Edward Lorenz 
and colleagues in the 1960s. The mathematical background had been sketched by 
Henri Poincare in the 1890s, but not until computers could run a large numbers of 
versions of a system in a short time could the beautiful world of the strange attractor be 
discovered. 
  
Lynas’s book Six Degrees. A ‘six-degree’ world would be one of 
ferocious hurricanes, oxygen-starved oceans supporting little life and 
subject to upwellings of highly toxic hydrogen sulphide, and huge 
releases of methane from the tundra leading to atmospheric explosions 
and damaging the ozone layer (Lynas 2008:217-41). 
The possibility that atmospheric carbon dioxide could affect the balance 
between absorption and radiation of solar energy has been known since 
John Tyndall’s work in 1864. However, not till 1960 was there good 
evidence that atmospheric carbon dioxide was increasing. That the 
climate is now changing is strongly supported by evidence such as global 
temperature records, changes in seasons and the behavior of wildlife, sea-
level rise, melting glaciers, reduction in Arctic sea-ice, and shrinking of 
ice-sheets.9 Without the insights of modern science we would have no 
way of linking these effects to human activity. However, the consensus of 
the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) is strongly that 
these changes have been precipitated by humans’ raising the levels of 
greenhouse gases, especially carbon dioxide, in the atmosphere.10 
One interesting development in science in the last few years is the 
tendency to ascribe every major extinction event (and destruction of 
 
9 www.metoffice.gov.uk/climate-change, accessed 14 December 2012. 
10 www.ipcc.ch, accessed 15 December 2012. For a summary of the science of 
climate change see Burroughs  
  
human society) to past climate changes.  For an example of such thinking 
see Finnegan et al. 2011; for a summary article see Biello 2007.  
It was thought until very recently that none of these historic changes 
could have been human-induced. Only in the last two hundred years, 
through the burning of large quantities of fossil fuels, did it seem that 
humans had the capacity significantly to increase levels of atmospheric 
greenhouse gases. A recent study however suggests that it is at least 
possible that human-induced extinction of large herbivores such as the 
mammoth could have reduced atmospheric methane sufficiently to 
precipitate the last ice age (Smith, Elliott and Lyons 2010).     The more 
general point is that, despite the rhetoric of James Lovelock’s writings on 
Gaia (see e.g. Lovelock 1989), atmospheric conditions on Earth are not 
absolutely stable. Disruptions to those conditions can be occasioned by a 
wide variety of causes – asteroid impact and volcanism being the two 
most commonly invoked. These disruptions have had very profound 
effects. 
In a sense the bitter wrangle between the scientific community and the 
‘climate change deniers’ misses the point. It is impossible to be 
completely sure what combination of effects has given rise to the climate 
change that has recently been experienced. There may be a range of 
natural factors, as well as human activity (itself conducted – at least until 
recently - in ignorance of the damage it might cause) behind the effects 
  
that are already being experienced, such as ice-cap melting, increasing 
flooding and intensified hurricanes. But what both ‘sides’ ought to be 
able to agree is that continuing to force the climatic system by allowing 
the concentrations of greenhouse gases to rise further is extremely 
hazardous and liable to lead ultimately to the extreme effects of which 
Lynas writes. Fascinatingly, Lovelock’s own recipe for minimising the 
effects of climate change, and preventing Gaia from ‘throwing us off’ is 
the large-scale use of nuclear power (Lovelock 2006). For a sense that 
that alone will not be enough see Pacala and Socolow 2004. On the 
inadequacy of current policy initiatives on climate change mitigation see 
Latin 2012. 
This discussion introduces the larger debate as to whether human 
response to the present crisis should be of a ‘technofix’ variety, using big 
science to get us out of our big mess, or whether our way forward lies 
more in an effort to become in Aldo Leopold’s phrase ‘a plain citizen of 
the biosphere’ (Leopold 1949). I explore this issue further in Southgate, 
2006b. It is an issue that lies largely beyond the scope of this essay; I 
only note here that a technology, nuclear fission, that was first designed 
to do previously inconceivable harm is now proposed as a way to salvage 
the human race from a crisis – major climate change – that it precipitated 
in all innocence. 
Incidentally, another example of science revealing something very 
  
unexpected (to many) about the world would be the psychological 
experiments of Stanley Milgram at Yale on obedience to authority. 
Milgram demonstrated that there was a most disconcerting willingness 
among intelligent human subjects to inflict harms in response to the 
instructions of authority figures. While the ethics of this study have been 
questioned, its results are telling, and to most people a very surprising 
disclosure of the character of human nature. Theologians of original sin 
will have been the least surprised. 
My last case-study – the suffering of non-human creatures in evolution - 
may seem a curious one to choose. Chemical and nuclear warfare are 
moral evils made possible by science. Climate change can as we have 
seen be occasioned purely by non-human causes, or it may be 
exacerbated by human action and thus its ill-effects become a 
combination of moral and natural evil. The sufferings caused by 
predation and parasitism are pure natural evil – indeed they form as I 
have claimed elsewhere a special branch of natural evil that may be 
called ‘evolutionary evil’ (Southgate, 2008, ppp). This evil predates the 
evolution of human beings by many millions of years.11 Such suffering is 
not therefore a charge against human beings (as everyone who has 
 
11 Peter van Inwagen describes this as one of the (only) two contributions science has 
made to natural theology (van Inwagen 2006:112). In doing so he not only omits some 
other very important contributions, but also the teleological aspect to evolutionary 
suffering that I go on to discuss below. 
  
grasped the science of evolution, with the seeming exception of William 
Dembski, has now seen). Rather, for the Abrahamic monotheist at least, it 
is a charge against the goodness of God the creator of the world and (in 
the words of the Niceno-Constantinopolitan Creed) the ‘giver of life’ 
through the Holy Spirit. 
The first great gift that science gives us in respect of this problem is to 
make clear (or as clear as we can be about the experience of species other 
than our own) that non-human animals do experience pain and distress, 
which in some cases can indeed be regarded as suffering. This insight 
comes both from observation of animal behaviour: the way animals avoid 
noxious stimuli, and favour damaged limbs, for example; also the way 
social animals when hurt cry out for assistance, and from 
neurophysiological studies of brain function and hormonal activity (see 
deGrazia 1996:Ch. 5). All of these lines of evidence stress the 
commonalities between the experience of human and that of other 
animals. So it is no longer possible to hold as some have persisted in 
doing that non-human creaturely suffering is not real. We have moved a 
long way from the conclusion that the distinguished biologist and 
theologian, Charles Raven, was still able to draw in 1927 that ‘[I]t may be 
doubted whether there is any real pain without a frontal cortex, a foreplan 
in mind, and a love which can put itself in the place of another, and these 
are the attributes of humanity’ (Raven 1927:120)  
  
The theological problem that the world God created contained creatures 
tearing each other apart was known long before the work of Darwin. 
Already in the 13th Century Aquinas concerned himself with how lions 
are to eat (though the Psalmist and the author of Job seem less 
concerned12). The famous phrase ‘nature red in tooth and claw’ was 
written by Tennyson ten years before the publication of The Origin of 
Species. But the decisive contribution of Darwin to the problem of 
theodicy was to show that creaturely suffering is not just incidental to 
evolutionary processes, but intrinsic to their functioning. In Holmes 
Rolston’s wonderful phrase ‘the cougar’s fang has carved the limb of the 
fleet-footed deer, and vice versa’ (Rolston 2006:134). Rolston has done 
much to help us see how some of the characteristics we most admire in 
animals (including ourselves) have been refined by certain sorts of 
evolutionary pressures and strategies for responding to them (Rolston            
). It is this interweaving of values and disvalues in evolution that caused 
Darwin to write both that ‘There is grandeur in this view of life’ (Origin 
of Species    ), and in a letter to J.D. Hooker that ‘what a book a devil’s 
chaplain might write on the clumsy, wasteful, blundering, low and 
horridly cruel works of nature!’ 13 
 
12 See e.g. Ps. 104.     ; Job        . 
13 www.darwinproject.ac.uk. The letter to Hooker, dated July 13 1856, is 
  
This intrinsic coupling of suffering to natural selection, which Darwin’s 
work strongly suggested, exacerbates the problem of evolutionary 
theodicy by making it seem that God has used suffering to further what 
were presumably divine selection.14 Strictly speaking this is an insight 
from before the period on which this volume focuses, but confirmation 
that natural selection could deliver large-scale changes from small genetic 
variations had to await the so-called ‘new synthesis’ on the 1940s. 
Actually there is a further aspect to this problem, of which Darwin was 
unaware, and which has not to my knowledge yet been discussed in the 
literature. This relates to the origin of heritable variation within species. 
Natural selection can only work on such variations, and we now know 
that these arise through various processes of mutation (including the 
recombination made possible by sexual reproduction). We also know that 
most of this mutation is either neutral or harmful and it may occasion 
great suffering, as we know from the various heritable diseases that have 
survived in the human. In other words both natural selection itself, and 
what makes it possible, are sources of suffering, and this suffering is, as 
noted, intrinsic to the processes of creaturely change. 
Our scientific insights, then, allow us to dispense with crude models of 
 
catalogued as Letter No. 1924. (accessed August 13 2007). 
14 Though this would be disputed by a thinker such as Ruth Page. 
  
the designer God such as were propounded up to time of William Paley. 
In this sense Darwinism is as was claimed by Aubrey Moore in Lux 
Mundi ‘the disguised friend’ of faith (see Peacocke 2001). As it happens, 
direct divine design has recently attempted a reappearance in theology 
through the work of intelligent design theorists such as Michael Behe. 
For a range of assessments see Pennock       . The theodicy problems 
posed by such a model of divine action, when combined with an overall 
model based on evolution, seem unbearable. This would be a picture of a 
God who created by means of the process of evolution, but stepped in to 
repair or improve the products of that process at various points, while 
refusing to act to prevent the vast rafts of creaturely suffering that that 
process engenders. It is more and more clear to me that intelligent design, 
for all its professed agnosticism about the evolution-creationism debate, 
only works at all theologically in a young-earth creationist model in 
which natural evil is the product of the sin of the first humans. Such a 
model is completely out of keeping with all that the natural sciences tell 
us about the age and character of the world.  
But the problem posed by what I have called the ‘teleological aspect of 
evolutionary theodicy’ – the sense that God might have used a suffering-
filled process for God’s own ends – remains a severe one, only just 
beginning to be addressed (Southgate, 2008; 2011). Both the recent 
monographs on evolutionary theodicy (Southgate, 2008; Murray, 2008) 
  
call for a ‘compound’ approach, recognizing that no one argument is 
likely to be satisfactory by itself. Both are attracted to the argument that 
certain values can only evolve in the presence of certain disvalues (see 
also Attfield 2006:Chs. 6-7; Alexander 2009 on this ‘only way’ or 
‘package deal’ argument). That must surely be a significant element in 
any theodicy that faces the teleological charge mentioned above, in 
respect of the suffering caused by predation and disease. Importantly, a 
similar argument can be mounted in respect of other aspects of natural 
evil, such as the earthquakes and volcanoes generated by tectonic 
activity. What is important for this present discussion is that scientific 
insights into evolution have forced theologians to think more deeply 
about the problem of non-human creaturely suffering in evolution. 
However, I have become convinced that that argument by itself will not 
suffice. It is an argument that seeks to justify a system, in terms of the 
balance of values it offers against disvalues. But suffering is experienced 
by individuals, and sufferers are not consoled by systems, even if they 
were to be aware of them. The whole tenor of theodicy since the 
Holocaust has been away from any sense that larger systems of meaning 
dissolve away the significance of the individual sufferer. For a very 
thoughtful exploration of the inadequacy of traditional theodicies in this 
regard see Surin1986. Evil, then, must be addressed at the level of the 
sufferer, whether that be a tortured human, a fawn trapped in a fire, or a 
  
sealion tossed and torn apart by orcas. For the Christian theologian that 
may mean affirming God’s co-suffering with every creature that suffers 
(Peacocke     ; McDaniel 1989; Southgate 2008. It may also mean 
positing eschatological fulfillment for creatures who know no flourishing 
in this life (Edwards 2006; Russell 2008; Southgate 2008). There were 
hints of this in the Christian tradition (for example in the thought of John 
Wesley) but in the light of the theodicy problem as science now shows it 
to us, this emphasis is coming to be the mainstream view. 
My last case-study, then, shows how the science of creaturely harms 
moves us beyond the ancient answers derived by the Christian tradition 
from its foundational texts (especially in this case Genesis 3), and enables 
theology to explore a more challenging but in the end a far richer model 
of the relationship of God to creatures. It also, as colleagues and I have 
indicated elsewhere, allows a re-reading of some scriptural texts in ways 
that may help Christians engage with the present ecological crisis (see 
Horrell, Hunt and Southgate, 2010). 
 
Conclusion 
What I have tried to stress in this essay is the complex and ambiguous 
relationship of the modern sciences to evil. The sciences have been used 
in a range of ways to potentiate the infliction of moral evil – these ways, 
and the willingness to develop and use them, have varied in complex 
  
ways with the context, scientific, technological and political, in which the 
possibilities of such potentiation have appeared. But I have questioned 
any simplistic model for understanding the role of science, just as I have 
also questioned certain common assumptions about particular sorts of 
‘scientific’ weapons, especially chemical warfare. 
I have gone on to show that the sciences also reveal the character of evils 
in ways that may not have been obvious, or even detectable, by other 
aspects of human wisdom. These evils may be engendered, or 
exacerbated, by humans, but science also helps us see more clearly the 
character of natural evil.  
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